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NOTES
The Right of An Insured to Appeal From a
Judgment Satisfied by His Insurer
Automobile liability insurance is a practical necessity today because
the insurance companies through their method of risk distribution have
relieved policy holders from the financial pitfalls which otherwise might
leave the negligent driver open to ruinous liability. Viewed through the
eyes of the insured, the indemnity contract is one solely for his benefit. The
primary motive of the insurer, on the other hand, when one of its policy
holders is in a position of possible liability, is not to protect the insured
as much as it is to protect and minimize any liability which the insurer
might incur because of the insurance contract. In other words, saving
the insured from liability is a means by which the insurer is able to
tprotect itself. This fact is particularly true in Ohio where by statute the
insurer is liable along with the insured and subject to suit should a judgment
against the insured not be satisfied within 30 days after its rendition.' The
insurer, in pursuance of this motive, may, on some occasions, prejudice the
rights of the insured by settling a suit which is pending against the insured,
by allowing a consent judgment to be taken against him, or by refusing to
appeal a judgment which is rendered against him.
Generally speaking, the insurance company in its contract has reserved
the right to control any settlement or litigation in which the insured may be
subject to liability. The extent -to which the courts have looked with ap-
proval on such clauses is indicated by this statement of the highest court of
Massachusetts:
An insurance company... has an absolute right to dispose of an action
brought against its insured ... in such a way as may appear to it for its
best interest. It is not bound to consult the interests of the insured to the
prejudice of its own interests in case of conflict between the two....'
If there is an honest dispute as to who is liable in an auto collision, the
insured or the party claiming against him, the insured may have his possible
cause of action against the other party prejudiced by an over zealous -insur-
ance company which settles a claim or permits a judgment to be rendered
OHIO REv. CODE § 3929.05 provides that in case of bodily injury or death the in-
surer is absolutely liable where it has insured the losing party. OHIO REy. CODE §
3929.06 provides that where the insured has suffered a judgment against him for
bodily injury, death or damage to property if the judgment is not satisfied within
30 days the plaintiff may file a supplemental petition in the original suit and join
the insurer as a party defendant. In U.S. Car. ins. Co. v. Gilmore, 6 Ohio L. Abs.
334 (1928) the court held that where the insured appealed the insurer was still
liable under the statutes to satisfy the judgment against their insured. Apparently
at that time an appellant had more than 30 days to file his appeal.
'Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 277 Mass. 428,430, 178 N.E. 737,738 (1931).
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against their insured. In such a case when the insured brings suit against
the claimant for damages, he will be faced with the defense that the question
has already been settled against him. He will find that he is estopped to
bring his suit by the action of the insurance company on the theory of satis-
faction of the claim, or on the theory of res judicata.
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in the case of Ross v. Strickers shows
this problem in bold relief. (For purpose of simplicity, the plaintiff, Ross,
will be referred to as "A," and the defendant, Stricker, "'B") As the result
of an automobile collision between the parties, A sued B for the personal
injuries he sustained. B, in his answer, denied any negligence on his part,
and counter-claimed alleging that A's negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the injuries suffered by B. At the trial a verdict and judgment were
rendered in favor of A on his cause of action and against B on his cross-peti-
tion. B's insurance company, deeming it inexpedient to appeal, satisfied
the judgment against their insured (B) over his protest.' B, by his own at-
torney, caused his protest to be entered on the record. B then appealed from
the judgment against him on his cross-petition and in the court of appeals
secured an order for a new trial. The court of appeals, for all practical
purposes admitted that B had a good cause of action against A.5 The Ohio
Supreme Court took the case on A's motion to certify. In that court A
contended that since B was enjoying the benefits of a satisfied judgment he
was estopped to prosecute further his appeal on the cross-petition. The
court, however, felt that the problem was more involved than that presented
by A and held that since the judgment for A was still standing, B could not
hppeal. Their theory was that the parties to that adjudication (the action by
A against B) were the same and that the finding of B's negligence was un-
disturbed and still standing. Thus, B was estopped to assert that he was not
negligent when the first finding of fact was based on the same transaction
from which he now seeks to appeal.
The practical results are obvious. The court of appeals has all but said
that B has a valid cause of action against A. However, in the view of the
supreme court decision, B has no recovery. His insurance company, for all
practical purposes, has destroyed his right to appeal. B obviously did not
wish to appeal the judgment on A's cause of action because, had he done so
and lost, the insurance company would claim that he failed to cooperate7
' 153 Ohio St. 153, 91 N.E.2d 18 (1950). The case is not so startling in view of
the general law on the subject; however, as applied by the court it leads to disastrous
results for the insured.
'See note 1 supra.
,Ross v. Stricker, 85 Ohio App. 56, 88 N.E.2d 80 (1949). This is the court of
appeals decision.
6Ross v. Stricker, 153 Ohio St. 153, 156, 91 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1950).
,Generally all insurance contracts contain a clause which provides that if the assured
[Fall
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with them. Should the insurer prevail in this contention the policy would
be voided and the insurer relieved of any liability under Ohio law. The
insurance company cannot object, however, when B appeals on his cross-
petition. If B appeals A's case, the insurance company may wait for A to
sue it, which, as previously noted, he may do." The insurer would then
raise the defense that B had breached the cooperation clause by appealing.
If it were decided that B had done so, neither A nor B could recover from
the insurance company because A's right to collect from it depends upon
B's right to do so.0
The principle that where a judgment between two parties settles a dis-
puted fact, one of the parties or his privy may not in a later action contend for
a different result, is well settled.' 0 Yet in line with the Ohio Supreme
Court's policy of looking not only to the result of the case at bar but also
to its effect on cases which may arise in the future, an exception to that
principle would seem wise.
It is obvious that this is not the type of case in which a party seeks to
take advantage of that part of the judgment favorable to him and have the
unfavorable part reversed. For any judgment again B will be satisfied by
the insurer. But the insurer, on the other hand, should not be able to
destroy B's right of appeal or force him to buy another lawsuit.
Nor is it possible for B to allow the insurance company to satisfy the
judgment without informing it that he intends to appeal. The insurer is
able to wait 30 days" before he is subject to suit, while the insured will be
barred unless he files his notice of appeal within 20 days.'
In view of the Ross case, B is estopped from appealing on his cross peti-
tion alone when a judgment for A on the petition stands undisturbed. B is
left with but one avenue of escape to protect his cause of action; he must
appeal A's case as well as his own.
When B appeals both causes of action he is faced with several problems.
First, if the insurance company satisfies the judgment he has the problem
of appealing from a satisfied judgment. Secondly, if the insurance com-
pany does not satisfy the judgment and B loses his appeal, he may have to
litigate the question of whether or not his appeal was a violation of the
does not cooperate with the company in preparing a defense, the company will not
be liable for any judgment rendered against the insured.
' See note 1 supra.
'Storer v. Ocean Acc. & Guarantee Corp., 80 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1935). Violation
of the cooperation clause by the insurer will preclude liability of the insurance com-
pany in a suit by the third party against the insurance company.
"-Cf; State v. Martin, 154 Ohio St., 539, 544, 96 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1951); Fielder
v. Ohio Edison Co., 158 Ohio St. 375, 383, 109 N.E.2d 855, 859 (1952).
See note 1 supra.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.07.
19541
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
cooperation clause of the insurance contract. In this respect B is "buying"
another lawsuit. If B wins on his appeal, judgment could be rendered for
him in the appellate court or a new trial could be granted. At the second
trial, if B should lose, his position would still be perilous. Can he compel
the insurer to satisfy the judgment? If so, can he compel full payment
should the second judgment be for a greater amount than the first? The
answers to these questions require further discussion.
APPEAL FROM A SATISFIED JUDGMENT
Generally speaking, a party may not appeal from a satisfied judgment
where the satisfaction was voluntarily made with a view toward settlement
or compromise.'8 But where the satisfaction is made under compulsion or
coercion the right of appeal is not affected.14 Perhaps the best example of
legal coercion occurs when execution has been issued and the defendant's
land is about to be sold. In such cases the courts of most states, including
Ohio, have said that the payment was not voluntary and that the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the appeal because the question is moot will be over-
ruled.15 Some cases hold that execution need not be issued at the time the
defendant satisfies the judgment and that the defendant may still appeal, the
satisfaction being deemed involuntary.' 6  The more modern view finds
expression in the following words: the appellant "does not waive [his right
of appeal] where [satisfaction] is made or done to avoid execution or con-
tempt proceedings or under other compulsion for the exercise or protection
of legal rightsN'7 (emphasis supplied).
The following are some examples of specific cases in which satisfaction
of the judgment did not prevent appeal: Payment of taxes will not waive
he right of appeal where the tax is an annual levy and the appellant will
'be subject to the same tax in succeeding years.' Money paid into court
which the clerk pays to the successful party on his promise to repay if the
case is reversed will not waive appellant's right to appeal."9 When funds of
the appellant are attached and the garnishee pays the claim, such payment
112 Oio JuR. 2d § 157; 4 C.J.S. § 221 et. seq.
144 CJ.S. 5§ 221, 222.
'Lake Shore Elec. Ry. v. Rohrbacker, 48 Ohio App. 529, 186 N.E. 507 (1932);
Alimitos Land Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 Cal. 213, 17 P.2d 448(1933); Bank of
Linn Grove v. Stults, 93 Ind. App. 129, 176 N.E. 707 (1931); Guin v. Security
State Bank, 74 Okla. 102, 168 Pac. 804 (1917).
162 AM. JUR. § 574. See cases cited n.17.
174 C.J.S. § 214 C. In Beronio v. Pension Commr of Hoboken, 130 N.J.L. 620,
33 A.2d 855 (1943) the court said in syllabus number six: "Even voluntary pay-
ment ... unless made in compromise or settlement... does not necessitate ...
waiver of the right to appeal... "
"
8 Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. Ry. v. Martin, 53 Ohio St. 386, 41 N.E. 690 (1895).
'Felton v. Finley, 68 Utah 412, 195 P.2d 360 (1948).
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does not render the appeal moot.2" And when a bank which holds funds
allegedly conveyed to the appellant in fraud of her husband's creditors, pay-
ment of a judgment by the bank, which was joined as a party defendant,
will not adversely affect the appellant's right of appeal.21 In cases where
the appellant's surety satisfied a judgment rendered against its assured the
payment does not prejudice the appellants right to appeal because a surety
is subrogated to any rights the successful party had against the assured and
may sue the assured to recover such a loss. If the appeal is successful the as-
sured is relieved of any possible liability to the surety. Thus, the assured
has a genuine interest to protect and satisfaction of the judgment by the
surety will not defeat it.22
Though this rule has received general acceptance it is by no means uni-
versal. In following this procedure the insured would in all probability be
"buying himself a lawsuit." In a Kansas case, the appellanes construction
equipment was attached and, to prevent a sale, he paid the judgment and
costs. The court said that by paying the costs he waived his right to appeal.
By stressing the payment of costs the court intimated that had he paid the
judgment less the costs he might have saved his appeal.2 3
While there is no case directly in point with the principal fact situation,
by analogy B should be able to appeal from the judgment even though the
insurance company had satisfied it. True, it may be that in the suretyship
cases the surety is subrogated to any rights which the successful party had
against the assured while in the insurance cases there is no corresponding
right to sue the insured. However, the basic reason behind the rule which
prevents an appeal from a satisfied judgment is that the appellant should
not be able to appeal where he has settled or compromised the controversy.
Surely where the insurance company pays the judgment over the insured's
protest, the insured has not entered into a compromise or settlement. For
this purpose the insurer should not be considered the agent of the insured so
tas to bind him to the satisfaction of the judgment. Of course the appellant
can discharge his insurance company, but if he were to do so and then lose
)his appeal the insurance company would probably not have to satisfy the
judgment. Since he has paid for his insurance coverage there is no reason
why he should be forced at his own risk to hazard an appeal which if un-
successful would destroy all his rights under the policy. Such a result allows
the insurer to force the insured to bargain away his right of appeal.
' Hartke v. Abbot, 106 Cal. App. 388, 289 Pac. 206 (1930).
'La Borde v. Farmer's State Bank, 116 Neb. 33, 215 N.W. 559 (1927).
'Hartford Acc. & Indem Co. v. Ankeny, 261 P.2d 387 (Ore. 1953); Mastel v.
Rovira, 164 La. 1099, 115 So. 283 (1928).
'Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394, 182 P.2d 891 (1947). The costs were about
$300 while the judgment was for some $79,000.
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EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT BY THE INSURER BEFORE JUDGMENT
We have a similar problem when the insurance company settles the
case before judgment. The insurer has an absolute right to control any
settlements of litigation involving the policy holder even to the prejudice of
'the insured's rights. In such situations it has been generally held that the
insurance company is not the agent of the insured, 2 and a settlement by it
without the actual knowledge or consent of the insured is not binding upon
him. Thus, when the insurer settled a claim without the knowledge of the
insured and the insurance company was taken over by the state superin-
tendent of insurance before the claim was paid, the insured did not have
to respond in a suit against him based on the settlement. Since the insurer
had complete control of the settlement to the extent that the insured could
not intervene even if he wished to do so, he is not bound.2 5 Even when a
settlement was reached in open court with the knowledge of the insured a
subsequent suit against him because the insurance company had become in-
solvent failed because the insured in settling did not personally agree to
pay or admit liability.
2
The same result follows when the insurance company settles with a party
who raises the defence of settlement in a subsequent suit by the insured for
damages arising out of the same transaction.27 The insured may prosecute
his case.
If the insured defendant denies any negligence on his part and counter-
claims alleging negligence on the part of the plaintiff, a settlement by the
insurance company may not be made the basis for a motion to dismiss by
the plantiff.28 Although this situation differs from the principal case un-
der discussion because there is no judgment against the insured, there is a
great deal of similarity between the two. Since the court refused to allow
the plaintiff in the one suit to take advantage of the settlement to the in-
sured's disadvantage it appears that in the analagous situation where there is
a satisfied judgment the insured should still be able to appeal.
SUITS BY THE INSURED AGAINST His INSURER
Returning to our original fact situation it must be remembered that the
insurer satisfied a judgment against its insured who was then precluded
from appealing his counter-claim by reason of estoppel. A similar situa-
"
4Foremost Daries v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938);
Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N.E.2d 68 (1941); Jetton v. Polk, 17 Tenn.
App. 395, 68 S.W.2d 127 (1934).
' Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, 34 N.E.2d 68 (1941).
"
8Countryman v. Breen, 211 N.Y. Supp. 744, aff'd, 268 N.Y. 643, 198 N.E. 536
(1935).
'Foremost Dairies v. Campbell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938).
' De Carlucci v. Brasley, 16 N.J.Super. 48, 83 A.2d 823 (1951).
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don arose in Long v. Union Indemnity Co. 9 which concerned an automobile
collision. A sued B and B turned the matter over to his insurance company.
Then B sued A in another county for his injuries. When A learned of this
suit he demanded -that the insurer of B enter a consent judgment against B.
The insurer complied. Meanwhile B had won his suit in the other county.
A then took the judgment to the court in which B had prevailed and made it
the basis of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A's motion
was granted. B then sued his insurance company because his rights had
been prejudiced by their granting of the consent judgment. The court held
that B was estopped by A's judgment from suing A on his cause of action.
Note that in B's case against A he had won a verdict, thus establishing that
A was at fault in causing the accident. The court held that B should have
sought his relief against A in the original suit but failed to point out what
avenue of attack would have been open to B in that action. The obvious in-
ference is that B could have appealed 30
A unique case arose in New York3 ' wherein the insured's policy in-
,demnified him to the extent of $1500. The plaintiff in an earlier suit had
offered to settle for $1500, but the insurance company chose to defend the
action. A verdict and judgment were rendered against the insured in the
amount of $6000. The insured appealed and obtained a reversal. He then
sued the insurer for his attorney fees and the costs of appeal, which to-
gether exceeded the limits of the policy. Held: the insured may recover.
The court held that since the insurer would pay the insured only after he
had satisfied the plaintiff's judgment it in effect prevented his appeal. Al-
though this situation is distinguishable from the Ross case it does show
the attitude of one court toward an insurer that tried to destroy the rights of
its insured. We can only speculate whether, had the insured lost his appeal,
the results would have been the same.
In another case against an insurer the insured alleged that the plaintiff in
an earlier suit against him had offered to settle for $5,000, the limit of the
policy. The insurer refused the offer and went to trial. Judgment was
rendered for $12,500. The insured alleged that the insurer had exercised
bad faith in refusing to settle. In overruling the insurer's demurrer, the
court stated that the insurer could not deal in such a manner as to render
3277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931).
id. at 430, 178 N.E.2d at 738. "An insurance company ... has an absolute right
to dispose of an action brought against its assured ... in such a way as may appear to
it for its best interests. It is not bound to consult the interests of the assured to the
prejudice of its own interests in case of conflict between the two, and the fact of
protest by the insured is immaterial"
' Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
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the insured liable for a judgment for more than the limits of the policy. 2
This decision again shows the willingness of the courts to protect the in-
sured.
FAILURE OF AN INSURER TO SATISFY THE JUDGMENT
When the insurer has not paid the plaintiff, but awaits the outcome of
the insured's appeal, the insured is faced with still another problem. If he
loses the appeal the insurance company might claim non-cooperation and
refuse to satisfy the judgment. It is unlikely the insured could compel the
insurer to pay into court while awaiting the result of the appeal. More basic
is the question of whether the appeal would constitute non-cooperation
within the contemplation of the insurance contract. Cases have been found
in which such an appeal by the insured was considered as not cooperating
with the insured. But the spirit behind the clause does not seem to extend
that far. Its main purpose is to protect the insurer against collusion between
the claimant and the insured.3 3 All that should be required is a full and
frank disclosure of all the facts to the insurer.34
The question of what the insurer would do if the appellate court ordered
a new trial must be considered. If the insured loses the new trial and the
verdict is much larger will the insurer be held for this greater amount in
view of the fact that it was willing to satisfy the prior judgment which was
for a lesser amount? If the insurer awaits the appeal and the insured is suc-
cessful both on appeal and at the new trial, the insurer will reap a large
benefit. It does not seem logical, then, to allow the insurer to secure the
benefit from the insured's appeal without taking a commensurate risk
should the judgment be greater at the new trial.
It is interesting to note that in the reverse situation, i.e., where the in-
surer appeals over the protest of the insured and wins a new trial at which
the judgment exceeds the limits of the policy, the insurer is held liable for
this excess.3" Even though this is provided for in the contract it would
be unjust if the law were to fail to provide a remedy for the insured where as
a consequence of his appeal the new trial results in a larger judgment.
LouIs W. KEMPF
'Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Maryland, 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W.
1081 (1916).
" State Auto. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939).
31 See 9 WORDS & PHRASES, Cooperation, for further definitions.
'Dawson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 298 Mass. 141, 83 N.E.2d 407 (1911). See 8
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE 4681 where the author categorically
states that allowing control of the defense is for the benefit of the insurer "in the
sense that where there is a conflict of interests the insurer may exercise the right to
defend for his own interests, even though a different course would have been pref-
erable from the standpoint of the insured."
